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Discussion After The Speeches of Anne Brunsdale and
Robert Bertrand and The Comments of Gary Horlick
and Jonathan T. Fried

COMMENT, ProfessorKing: You covered a lot of ground in a very
short time. I wanted to throw the session open to questions or comments; and if any of the commentators have any questions for the panelists, I would be happy to hear them.
QUESTION, Mr. Graham: Mr. Horlick, from what I am reading
about the U.S. literature and other literature about the GATT, much of
what you say about the lack of substantive rules and which mechanisms
apply are equally true of the GATT. Do you really think that we can
come up with something in these negotiations that would produce a
model that could then be translated into the Uruguay Round without the
Europeans and others totally blocking it?
ANSWER, Mr. Horlick: To be honest, we probably will not produce such a model on contingency protection. What I had in mind, in
saying that the United States and Canada share principles, was a reference to an attempt in 1982-83 to negotiate definitions of subsidy in the
GATT. We actually got an agreement among the experts from the
United States, Canada, the EEC, and Japan on what a subsidy is. But
there is no political will, and there are great differences on how, to value
a subsidy. In practical terms those really do not matter. The problem
then was getting politicians to agree to any of that. My reference really
was to the entire agreement. I think there are a number of things-services, investment, intellectual property-the agreements on which will
form an aspirational model, but not necessarily a model to be followed.
QUESTION, Mr. Graham: I have a follow-up question on dispute
resolution mechanism in particular. I was very struck by Jon Fried's
point that, because of the retaliation nature of the solution, the GATT
system creates more problems in restrictive trade and, therefore, destroys
the whole fundamental nature of what the agreement was supposed to
do, which was to free up trade. Do you see any way in which that can be
addressed?
ANSWER, Mr. Horlick: Actually, I'm mildly optimistic about dispute resolution, probably because the end of the Uruguay Round is so far
away. As you know, this is a major priority for the United States, and
one of the aspects of GATT dispute resolution which to me is most striking is that most of the disputes statistically aren't a big deal. I think a
U.S./Canadian tribunal can provide precedence for the fairly routine
handling of disputes. I'm not saying that we are going to have a GATT
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dispute resolution mechanism that will take on the big issues as the
U.S./Canada mechanism will have to. But it will provide a model with
which most lawyers are familiar. Labor disputes range from the tiny
shop floor dispute to the threat of a strike. The GATT treats everything
as a threat of strike issue, even though most of these disputes are "where
do you stand on the shop floor?" type issues. A U.S./Canadian tribunal,
properly negotiated, can provide some guidance for the shop floor-type
disputes.
QUESTION, ProfessorKing: Do you have any feel for the United
States Trade Representative's position on this?
ANSWER, Mr. Horlick: Officially, of course, it is all a secret. However, my own view from talking to the negotiators is that the U.S. negotiators are willing to discuss these things. What is missing is the political
push from the business constituency to say that the United States is willing to do these things. Everyone who opposes it on very narrow grounds
is out there lobbying very vigorously against the proposal. Basically,
U.S. businesses favor the proposal but aren't pushing hard enough yet. If
they push hard, the United States is willing to make these deals because
there is a benefit for us on services and investment. The same is true in
Canada. Overall, the USTR is not opposed but is scared for the lack of a
business constituency.
COMMENT, Professor King: That's my sense, too. I don't know
whether it is something about the USTR communication with business
or whether it's just an omission-from being too busy with the negotiations-but there hasn't been the business constituency thus far.
COMMENT, Mr. Horlick: There's not been the mobilization that
occurred in the Tokyo Round.
QUESTION, Mr. Magnus: I am enjoying this metaphor of the stadium. We have got our two teams on the field. We have also got some
teams that are neither Canadian nor American and they come in with
their trade practices, dumping, subsidies. From a Canadian prospective,
do you see that the measure of injury vis-d-vis other trade practices
outside the stadium, but coming into Canada, would be measured against
a market which has Canada as a denominator or has North America as a
denominator?
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: I think you can't answer that question without being able to analyze in detail the rule of origin provision. Let me
move back a step before taking that point further. It's not unfamiliar, at
least to the ITC, to administer two different standards depending on origin of goods. It's not unfamiliar to Canada, at least in tariff matters respecting GSP and, for evaluation purposes, code and noncode members.
In principle, one can envisage, and should properly envisage, a different
discipline applying to those prepared to take on the obligations in the
Free Trade Area than those from outside.
In terms of how best to assess the impact of incoming goods into
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Canada which may be distorting trade by virtue of the unfair practice, it
seems to me there are two aspects. One is the question that you raised in
which, if there is an import displacement effect, you may want to consider not only which standard to apply, but also the standing to be given
to American producers. The second is how to control the onward dealing with the goods in the North American marketplace. Maybe that's
the way to divide it; that the first crossing of the border can properly be
on a Canadian market standard, as long as you are satisfied that your
rule of origin provisions and your customs administration is effective
enough to accurately and adequately control the onward shipment of the
goods into the other country's market.
What I'm trying to suggest is, in a North American free trade area,
if you combine this with Mr. Horlick's suggestion and give an American
industry standing in Canada to complain about this third country good
coming into the Canadian market by virtue of its import displacing effect, then you have begged the question of whether it is a Canadian industry, or an American industry, or a North American industry.
It is almost an analogy to merger standards. What is the relevant
market for this import? It may be Canada. It may be North America. It
may be New England, or Quebec. I think you want that flexibility in the
standard depending on the market at which it is aimed.
QUESTION, Mr. Herman: I'm interested in the interrelationship
that is envisioned between private-type remedies and public-type remedies in dispute settlement. I can see the possibility of having a bilateral
dispute settlement body that would deal with such things as unfair trade
practices; section 301 actions in the United States and the question of
subsidies.
How does that relate to private remedies? For example, in a section
201 case, the decision has to be based upon a consideration of national
priorities, because that's the essence of the section 201, or safeguard action. It's hard for me to visualize a bilateral body that would deal with
those kinds of actions which are so inherently political and national, not
binational in scope, in terms of the relief that might be ordered.
Also, what happens in the case of a dispute over whether a particular type of action is or is not a justifiable subsidy under the bilateral
agreement and the determination is that the action is not justifiable? Do
the private remedies then take effect or is the relief ordered to the private
party by the bilateral body? That is, how do you relate the private line
remedy to the public dispute settlement mechanism?
ANSWER, Mr. Bertrand: The interesting point you raise is the issue of making the link between what I call public and private enforcement. What may be contemplated is whether the trade agreement can
embody mechanisms or simulate the private remedies and adjustment.
The negotiators need to have imagination to give the market forces
the push that the forces might need in order to have their own self-polic-
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ing system. For example, in an anti-dumping case where another company is dumping in Canada, we can simply try to devise a system that
would allow the injured party some form of redress or market redress.
Assume that you are dumping in Canada at a certain price and that
I can establish it. Perhaps I should be able to obtain the price difference
as a remedy, or I should be allowed to buy the goods at your place at the
same price and dump in your market. Self-discipline would work out the
problem. Self-discipline would make sure that any dumping would not
last any length of time. I think I would put my faith in adjustment by
the business community, so long as they have the proper tools to do it.
QUESTION, Mr. Herman: I have no problem with the dumping
situation, because, quite frankly, I don't think that's a real problem in the
North American context. A lot of attention does not need to be devoted
to dumping because statistics show that dumping affects a very small
portion of Canada/U.S. trade. But what about the subsidy situation?
ANSWER, Mr. Bertrand: I'm assuming that you have to start first
with the national treatment and with the same opportunity for every firm
in the market to obtain the subsidy; so if you don't have those, the situation wouldn't work. The only things to be concerned about are the corrective measures of subsidy that have been in place and have allowed the
structure to endure. A good scientific and economic agreement would
probably lead you to letting out two aspects of the subsidies. One is cost
benefit, looking at the cost of what our subsidy is intended to do. The
other aspect is a question of what subsidies are obtained in the other
country.
QUESTION, Mr. Bilder: I wonder if it is worrisome that both the
commentators as well as Mr. Legault have all seemed to state that some
kind of autonomous third party or autonomous binding dispute settlement mechanism is almost a sine qua non to the agreement. That can be
very worrisome because it might be difficult to get an agreement on this
kind of a third party dispute settlement. As desirable as it might be, it is
troublesome to say we have got to have this when we only might be able
to get it.
Why is this of such concern? Obviously it is desirable, but private
parties, countries, the United States and Canada certainly have lived a
long time and have managed to deal with their problems without binding
dispute settlement. What is so very special about the Free Trade Agreement that makes this so essential? Couldn't we live with something less
than an autonomous third party dispute settlement?
ANSWER, Mr. Horlick: I'll give you a brief response for now.
Businesses can live with it because the GATT, for example, works without one and 90% of things go on just fine. My personal view is that the
reason that you need it is the lack of trust between the two countries.
Distrust has reached a high level in the wake of recent decisions that
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Canada won't accept the concessions the United States wants on services
and investment without a concession on contingency protection.
COMMENT, Professor King: We will get more into that later
tonight.
QUESTION, Mr. Hudec: The panel seems to be in agreement that
net subsidy is a good idea and I wouldn't want to let that idea go in the
record unchallenged. It seems to me that this net subsidy concept is just
one step away from scientific tariffs. If you are going to talk about compensating subsidies, I can't see how you, politically, could avoid talking
about consideration of other burdens which may also effect the position
of the two parties-your environmental regulations versus mine, your
labor laws versus mine, and so forth. You can get very quickly into a
process which would require you politically, in any event, to take account of all of the differences and conditions which weren't there when
Hobbes wrote. So I think that it is a very bad idea.
Second, on the dispute resolution tribunal question, both Mr. Horlick and Mr. Fried stated their cases in the context of time. Whatever
you can do with a dispute settlement tribunal in the context of time, you
can also do with the internal decision-making machinery of each
country.
What do you think about the relative benefits of an international
tribunal or binational tribunal versus simply speeding up the decisionmaking process of the two countries?
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: Let me try a ten-second response to that.
First, in regard to your comment, I said nothing about net subsidy. It is
important to comment on what kind of discipline might occur in the Free
Trade Agreement other than to say that Canada and the United States
have the unique opportunity to take multilaterally agreed disciplines one
step further at greater refinement, greater discipline, and more clarity to
the substantive rules involved based on the trade distorting effect in a free
trade area.
I did not premise my case for binational procedures on timing. I
think the timetables in the United States and in Canada under our procedures are considered by businessmen to be effective timetables. I think
you can achieve a result in just as short a timetable with more certainty,
more objective administration, more fairness, in a more balanced procedure as between petitioner and respondent than you can in our domestic
procedures as currently administered in each of our systems.
ANSWER, Mr. Horlick: Let me just briefly reply on net subsidies.
I recognize the slippery slope. One can work within the context of the
specific programs alleged to be subsidies without having to take into account all of the other effects you mentioned. Just for an example, say
you are looking for an incentive to a business to do something. If it is
paying tax on a grant, that payment effects the way the business responds
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to the incentive and you can measure that. You can look at its tax return, so it is measurable within limits without sliding down the slope.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: Let me add one other point, if I may.
That is, I did try to emphasize an intermediate stage of consultation of
dispute avoidance, in which both sides would take a more comprehensive
view of the problem than simply trying to find the handle; such as, is this
injurious, is this subsidy to deal with what is properly a market or adjustment problem in the North American environment?
That's a fundamental difference between domestically-administered
law and the kind of two-step binational procedure that would require
comprehensive oversight by the governments on the market conditions
first and dispute settlement as a last resort.
QUESTION, Mr. O'Grady: I was wondering about the halfway
measures that are more identifiable cost factors such as manufacturing
standards, packaging labeling, maybe even food and drug regulations. Is
that kind of problem going to come up, and if it does, is the binational
committee, if it exists, going to deal with it? Is it going to try to consult a
harmonization of the two sets of rules or is it possible that it might occasionally direct the legislatures to harmonize it?
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: I tried to state at the outset that the answer
depends on what is put into the Agreement. If there is a provision in the
Agreement for harmonized rules, they have to be administered. Most
problems, be it the individual rule of origin determination or the technical standard inspection, are not going to engage the political attention of
either or both governments. They are going to be handled by day-to-day
management and administration of the Agreement.
When an agricultural officer imposes a medical or health or sanitary
standard, domestic law will, in effect, be applied. It's not a question of
treaty interpretation or treaty application between the two governments
at that point. It is a matter of whether the domestic standards have been
properly applied. The affected business or private party or importer or
exporter at that stage would ordinarily have recourse, as available today,
to the administrative procedures in that department or to the quasi judicial or judicial review procedures.
Only when the problem becomes so pervasive, so profound, or so
serious as to cause either government to believe it may have an impact on
the relationship should there be an opportunity for the governments to
either lift it out or to say to each other, "wait a minute. We really better
clarify what our previous administration said fifteen years ago in terms of
their overall intent."
ANSWER, Mr. Horlick: Things like standards and labelling are going to be matters where the businesses on both sides will be able to use
the Agreement to harmonize. This is something they will want to do to
so save money. I think it will be one of the successes.

